Multifamily’s Grip Versus The Single Family Sector
We’re out in Phoenix this next couple of days, hosting a conference for multifamily housing finance executives.
Like almost everything these days, the housing crisis and broader, deeper economic crisis have polarized people into opposing sides of an economically, politically, and emotionally charged issue. One one side, there are those whose businesses’ interests focus mainly on multifamily for-rent units, and on the other, those who make a living doing single family for-sale housing.
It’s popular among multifamily executives to lay blame for society’s ills at the feet of home builders and residential developers of for-sale communities. Here’s a multifamily executive’s oft-chanted refrain these days, referring to the damage single family for-sale companies have wrought upon the universe.
- They overbuilt
- They overcharged
- They took our customers by seducing them with false come-ons and fraudulent financial processes and procedures into a homeownership dream those customers could not afford
- They ran their companies poorly, and sapped perfectly good lending institutions of their ability to sustain good healthy capital investments in multifamily deals and projects
- They are part of a conspiracy to expand homeownership in America, which devalues our competitive offerings in responsible housing
From October 1, 2008 on, the volume of the antagonism aimed at home builders by the multifamily industry sector’s leaders and trade association leadership has increased. Here’s how the National Multi Housing Council promotes its 2008 Annual Report:
2008 will long be remembered as the year that the easy credit days of the first half of the decade came to a crashing halt.
The looming credit crisis quickly expanded into a global financial crisis and eventually into one of the worst economic downturns in decades. It is also the year that policymakers and consumers had to admit—as NMHC had been warning for years—that, yes, there is such a thing as too much homeownership.
Last year, homeownership rates posted their sharpest decline in 20 years, falling from a peak of 69.1 percent in 2005 to 67.5 percent in 2008, a level last seen in 2001 and erasing all of the much-touted homeownership gains of the last administration’s “ownership society” initiative. Meanwhile the number of renter households jumped from 30.9 percent to 32.2 percent.
Multifamily companies’ access to capital, their own balance sheet exposure, their redoubled challenge to cope with rising vacancy rates and deteriorating rent power amid a rising tide of unemployment in America, all got swept into the viscious-circle vortex of soaring foreclosures, declining home values, stress on mortgage lenders, and in turn stress on commercial real estate lenders… all impacting earnings, hiring, spending, and sentiment.
Still, we feel that it’s a red-herring and a misstep for multifamily strategists to pin responsibility for the enormous dislocation in the economy on their brethren and sistren from the single family side of the housing equation.
Multifamily operators, owners, developers, and builders have a long list of opportunities, challenges, caveats, missteps, and smart tactics for survival into the next up-cycle in housing whenever that might occur over the next couple of years. No need to paint home builders as part of an evil conspiracy to siphon away renters with a panacea about homeownership for all.
Housing’s crisis is, at the bottom, a household-by-household balance sheet correction that added up to global proportions. You can see this clearly in analyses such as the one Calculated Risk has done about how people–the you and I kind of people–save and spend.
In his post, Personal Saving and Mortgage Equity Withdrawal, Calculated Risk maps out the grim difference between where savings could and should have been as opposed to where it was and is. If people are spending the phantasmagoric appreciation on their owned homes as if it is income, then we get a glimpse of how far we need to correct to pay that back. People can buy a lot of things with play money if it’s accepted currency, but when everyone realizes it’s play money after all, the false economic bouyancy comes to a sudden end.
The aggregate saving rate captures the behavior of both savers (who probably didn’t change their behavior) and “dissavers” (who borrowed heavily). The saving rate declined to zero, probably because the dissavers were using MEW as income.
Now that the Home ATM is closed, the saving rate is rising because of less borrowing – as dissavers are forced to live within their incomes.
This is the current challenge. People, especially if they fear lost income or the lost ability to generate income, save cash. Banks act on similar fears, and so they’re stuck in the limbo of our current unemployment trends.
Savers and “dissavers” alike are saving all at once.
That’s not anyone’s fault, and it’s human nature, and it’s ultimately the source of opportunity for people in housing if they can get past blaming one another for what’s wrong. Housing has an over capacity problem. Too many companies can build and operate and develop housing, and that’s what our wacky market will correct.
Meanwhile, we’re seeing good examples lately of how pricing can be a lever to move inventory and close the huge gap between the number of vacant household units there are and the demand for them. The “V” for value is still hidden somewhere in that gap.
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