The Redemption: Geithner Plan a Wall Street Hit
Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
This above all: to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
– William Shakespeare, English dramatist & poet (1564 – 1616)
–”Hamlet”, Act 1 scene 3
Click image for access to Geithner's Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece today.
The pipeline of trillion-dollar federal policy programs today offers the latest one that has made U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner the sudden darling of Wall Street. Odd that several weeks ago–two weeks into his new job description–many of those same Wall Street denizens declared Geithner worse than useless, and as recently as last week, there were over-unders on when he would be headed out Treasury’s revolving door in ignominy.
Back those few weeks, the appetite for a groundwork of principles that would support a plan was not there, but now that the plan has been filled-out and articulated, critics are shutting up long enough for Geithner to appear to know what he’s talking about when he refers to the global financial complex and the trouble that it’s in.
Now that Wall Street investors appear to have bought-in to the details, the credibility capital Geithner seems to have lost when he opened his mouth in amid the crawl of stock tickers in mid-February now is back within his grasp.
The question remains though. What does the program fix? Borrower? Lender? Anyone?
Economics Nobelist, Princeton professor and New York Times columnist, Paul Krugman spells out the administration’s and Geithner’s theory underlying the current plan to wrest toxic assets from the banking system, a theory he disagrees with.
But banks can also fail even if they haven’t been bad investors: if, for some reason, many of those they’ve borrowed from (e.g., but not only, depositors) demand their money back at once, the bank can be forced to sell assets at fire sale prices, so that assets that would have been worth more than liabilities in normal conditions end up not being enough to cover the bank’s debts. And this opens up the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic: people may demand their money back, not because they think the bank has made bad investments, but simply because they think other people will demand their money back.
Bank runs can be contagious; partly that’s for psychological reasons, partly because banks tend to invest in similar assets, so one bank’s fire sale depresses another bank’s net worth.
So now we have a bank crisis. Is it the result of fundamentally bad investment, or is it because of a self-fulfilling panic?
Clearly, the assumptions underneath the administration’s plan embrace the latter of the two causes. So the program and the process, and the articulation, and the defiance that accompanies the roll-out of the Public-Private Investment Program rely extensively on a conviction that restoring calm and confidence–even a measure of greed–will get a flow of funds going.
But the base of the problem remains. Bad loans occurred. Lenders and investors took bad risks around those loans. People bought homes they should not have bought–20%-plus of them were investor purchases for flipping purposes during the final two or three years of the run-up–and now the reset on the value or lack thereof of those loans and the investments on top of the loans, will be deferred as a complex delay-the-pain mechanism kicks into action, aggregating what was bad into a toxic pool for a later day, and setting refurbished bank balance sheets back into business like an afternoon at the dog-groomers.
The wager here is twofold. One is that investors, lured by the virtual elimination of risk, will find that this is the place for all that pent-up liquidity that had been awaiting “the floor” for asset pricing before it moved in for the strike. Two is that borrowers will exhibit a more steadfast commitment to the obligations of their loans.
In our need for instant gratification and immediate solutions, we may have a blast of “good news,” that can bouy spirits and keep stocks on an upward trajectory for the month.
But we can see in our closer look beneath the headlines on existing home sales, starts, permits, etc., that there’s a lot of work to do, and much of that work is going to be a good, old-fashioned work-out between buyer and seller based on what a property is worth today, and tomorrow, and the day after, to someone who wants to live in that property.
Borrowing and lending are part of real estate in North America. So Shakespeare’s admonition could never be taken literally. But a great dramatist and poet of today would probably figure out a way to add to the phrase somehow. “Neither a borrower nor a lender be (unless there’s sufficient skin-in-the-game for the borrower and unleveraged capital on the part of the lender).”
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